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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
HARRY THORSEN, ) 
MARKAY 
-vs-
JOHNSON 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
, et a] , ) 
Defendants. ) 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al. , : 
HARRY 
-vs-
THORSEN 
Plaintiffs and : 
Respondents, ) 
and DONALD GATES, ) 
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Appellants. : 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of §78-2-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 19 53 and Rule 4, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent Gooseberry Estates, a partnership 
("Gooseberry") asks this Court to affi rm the Order ai id Judgment 
subject of review on the basis that the uncontradicted evidence 
on the hearing to reassess damages entitles the Respondents to 
the revised (and reduced) damages awarded by the Court below. 
There remains no issue of liability — only the 
question of damages. 
The present proceeding is an appeal from the Judgment 
of the trial court in reassessing damages as directed by this 
Court [Thorsen vs. Johnson, et al.y 745 P.2d 1243 (1988)]. The trial court 
considered the matter on Motion and affidavits as provided in 
Rule 43(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and entered a Judgment 
for Gooseberry Estates in the amount of $38,785.00 as the 
difference in value of the damaged land as an entire parcel 
(undivided) immediately after injury as compared to its value 
immediately before, which value appraisers for both sides had 
agreed was $1,250.00 per acre. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Court in an opinion of November 5, 1987, (the 
Decision is found at 745 P. 2d at page 1243) affirmed the trial 
court's holding that Appellant Harry Thorsen ("Thorsen") was 
liable to Gooseberry for damages but remanded the case to the 
District Court for the reason that the amount of damages was 
arrived at by an erroneous method; instructing the lower Court 
to reassess damages by an appropriate formula. 
This Court's remanding decision (hereinafter "Thorsen 
I") was that the trial court had made several unjustified 
assumptions in calculating damages, citing the decision of 
1956, State vs. Tedesco, 4 U.2d 248, 291 P.2d 1028. That case 
held and this Court re-affirmed that the value of unestablished 
2 
lots In a proposed or uncompleted subdivision could not be the 
basis for fixing damages since the determination of cost to 
achieve ultimate condition as subdivided lots was not only 
conjectural and considerable but also that the ability to sell 
the 1 ots at a profit after paying those, selling, and marked 
absorption costs was impermissibly speci ilatjve. We do uoi take 
issue nor argue with that result. 
What we respectfi il ] y submit is that on remand and in 
reassessing damages the trial court did what was directed by 
this Court in Thorsen 1: it took the mutually agreed value of 
the land prior to the damage inflicted by Thorsen and deducted 
therefrom the value, after the damage had occurred, of the land 
salable as an undivided tract of 50.59 acres (the amount of 
land subject to this 1 I tJ gallon) and awarded damaqes based upon 
the difference. We respectfully suggest that the trial court 
pursued what was the proper if not, because cf r:;e uniqueness 
of the property and the circumstances established by the facts, 
the only method of calculating damages under the clear 
direction of this Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
whether Rule 4 3(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
compels ai i i i.AcUvztz >f trie trial cour tf s reassessment of damages 
where no evidence contradicts Gooseberry's proof by affidavits. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly applied the 
rule of before-and-after worth of the property damaged by 
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Thorsen!s abusive entry upon and waste committed to 
Gooseberry's lands. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASE LAW 
1. Rule 43(b) [formerly Rule 43(e)], Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure which reads: 
(b) Evidence on Motions, When a Motion is based on 
facts not appearing of record the court may hear the 
matter on affidavits presented by the respective 
parties*** 
2 . State vs. Walker, 743 P . 2 d 1 9 1 , 193 (Utah 1 9 8 7 ) . 
3 . Goodsell vs. Department of Business Regulation, 52 3 P . 2d 12 3 0 
(Utah 1 9 7 4 ) . 
4 . Board of Public Instruction vs. Meredith, 119 F . 2 d 712 ( 1 9 4 1 , 
CA5 L a ) . (Addendum v i ) 
5 . Roue her vs. Traders & General Ins. Co., 235 F .2d 423 (1956 , 
CA5 L a ) • (Addendum v i i ) 
6. Department of Highways vs. Schulhoff 167 C o l o . 7 2 , 445 
P .2d 402 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . 
PRIOR HOLDING OF THIS COURT 
T h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t T h o r s e n had c o m m i t t e d a c t i o n a b l e 
i n j u r y t o G o o s e b e r r y ' s p r o p e r t y f o r which T h o r s e n was l i a b l e i n 
damages b u t n o t damages p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e f o r m u l a i n i t i a l l y 
a d o p t e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t . T h i s C o u r t d i d n o t o v e r t u r n t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g t h a t t h e damage was done w i l l f u l l y and 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y and "*** was m a s s i v e , s e n s e l e s s , and p u r p o s e l e s s " 
[745 P . 2 d p . 1 2 4 8 ] . 
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The previous opinion of this Court is of estimable 
assistance in narrowing the considerations basic to reassessing 
damages: 
1. Mr. Justice Howe's analysis of the evidence 
observes agreement of opinion expressed by appraisers for both 
sides, and especially by Thorsen1s own appraiser, that the land 
had a pre-damage value of $1,250.00 per acre for the 50.59 
acres affected (745 P.2d at p. 1246). 
2. It is not proper to speculate on the amount which 
subdivided lots might bring or to conjecture what would be the 
cost of developing land into a subdivision disposable by the 
unit of lots; nevertheless, it is proper to inquire what the 
tract is worth, having in view the purpose for which it is best 
adapted (746 P.2d at p. 1246). That purpose is as a potential 
mountain subdivision. (Id.) 
3. Citing the case of Department of Highways vs. Schidhoff, 
167 Colo. 72, 445 P.2d 402 (1968), this Court approved the 
Colorado view that "it is proper to show that a particular 
tract of land is suitable and available for subdivision into 
lots and is valuable for that purpose" (745 P.2d at p. 1246). 
We do not dispute the facts to the extent they are 
listed in Thorsen's Brief ("Brief") except we have to add 
several determinations resolved in Thorsen I which are critical 
to plenary examination of this new appeal: 
(a) The evidence fully supports the Finding of 
Fact and Conclusion of the Court that Thorsen 
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exceeded and abused his right to enter upon 
Gooseberry's land to clear the ditch and that he is 
liable for damages (Thorsen at 745 P. 2d p. 1244 
[underscored phrases omitted from Appellant's 
abridgment of Thorsen I at Brief p.5]). 
(b) The Supreme Court's observation that "the 
ditch, as enlarged, might possibly impair access to 
parts of the proposed lots, but there was no evidence 
adduced [at the original trial on this subject", 
(f.n. at 1247 of 745 P.2d)] 
(We submit that the uncontradicted affidavits 
accompanying Gooseberry's Motion to reassess damages 
supply, in the manner permitted by Rule 43(b) 
U.R.C.P., evidence admittedly not adduced respecting 
that subject. 
(c) Recognition of the Bench ruling by Judge 
Tibbs that, after physically inspecting the property, 
he was "shocked at the damage done to the premises 
and [had] grave doubt *** it could even be used as a 
subdivision" (specific language of the trial court 
abstracted in the dissent, 745 P.2d at 1248). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gooseberry agrees with that part of Thorsen's 
Statement of the Case which details the history, the course of 
proceedings and disposition in the Court below. Following is a 
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brief augmenting Statement of Facts important to the issues for 
review. The Appellant will be referred to as "Thorsen" and the 
Respondents will be referred to collectively as "Gooseberry". 
Reference to proceedings in the trial court at which oral 
testimony was taken will be made by attaching the relevant 
pages to this brief indicating the page number in the 
reporter's transcript (Addendum pp. iv and v) . The affidavits 
filed under Rule 43(b) U.R.CP. are reproduced in full. A map 
for illustrative purposes is Addendum i; the affidavits as (ii) 
and (iii) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Upon remand to the District Court Gooseberry filed 
its Motion supported by affidavits and asking that damages be 
reassessed in compliance with the direction of this Court. 
The procedure adopted was as provided in Rule 43(b) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which reads: 
(b) Evidence on Motions. When a Motion is 
based on facts not appearing of record the 
court may hear the matter on affidavits 
presented by the respective parties*** 
The supporting affidavits are of D. Bruce Whited, 
Professional Engineer and Ken Esplin, appraiser used by 
Gooseberry in the original trial. (Addenda ii and iii, 
respectively) 
Appellant (Thorsen) filed no affidavits and offered 
no evidence whatsoever countering the Motion or diluting the 
grounds for the relief requested. Thorsen did file an opposing 
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brief with the trial court but no affidavits were attached. 
Summarized, the affidavits before the trial court 
established the following facts which, on reassessment of 
damages, were considered together with the existing record of 
evidence and the trial Judge's personal view of the property. 
The affidavits will be abbreviated and organized according to 
affiant: 
WHITED AFFIDAVIT 
(Addendum ii) 
1. Qualifications. Twenty (2 0) years1 experience as 
a professional engineer designing and supervising construction 
of municipal systems for water, sewer, street, bridge and 
airports, and design and supervision of development of 
subdivisions including those of the type planned for the 
property in this litigation. (Addendum ii, pp. 1, 2) 
2. Examination of Property. Inspected the property 
and examined the extent of damage inflicted by Thorsen. 
(Addendum ii, p. 2) 
3. Feasibility of Restoration. The cost of 
restoring the property to its pre-damaged condition or even to 
a condition capable of receiving improvements necessary for a 
subdivision is prohibitive. Uprooted, dislocated rocks and 
trees of immensity could never be incorporated into the back-
fill. (Addendum ii, p. 5) 
4. Even if restored without the trees the Thorsen 
trenching created a drainage barrier that would jeopardize the 
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restored area as well as all lower adjacent property. 
(Addendum ii, p. 4) 
5. Economics of Continuing Subdivision Project. A 
highly visible swath of the Thorsen trenching scars 18 out of 
the 3 3 proposed lots. Proposed prime lots are no longer prime. 
The ability to realize an economic profit from the proposed 
project no longer exists. (Addendum ii, p. 6) This scarring, 
by implication, would affect prime acres both above and below 
the trenching. 
The following are neither conclusions nor opinions 
but professional statements of fact declared upon the personal 
knowledge of this Civil Engineer: 
(a) His estimates do not include the cost of 
reforestation. (Addendum ii, p. 3) 
(b) The huge trench prominently and permanently 
scars the profuse, attractive forestation the land 
previously displayed. (Addendum ii, pp. 3, 6) 
(c) A drainage barrier and erosion sluice could 
not withstand a storm of even moderate intensity one 
such of which would damage not only the restored area 
but also the lower adjacent property. This dredging 
insult derogates every lot in the proposed 
subdivision except numbers 10 through 21 or 12 
proposed lots. Those 12 would be both less 
accessible because the trench blocks entrance, and 
utterly unattractive because of the trench's 
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proximity and bordering presence. (Addendum ii, p. 4) 
ESPLIN AFFIDAVIT 
(Addendum iii) 
1. The Character (Highest and Best Use) and Value of 
the Raw Land Before Thorsen Activity. The value of the 50.59 
acres, without any improvements was $1,250.00 per acre in the 
year 1980. This was based upon its highest and best use which 
was as a subdivision or a mountain lot development. The Esplin 
affidavit distinguishes the remainder of the land purchased by 
Gooseberry and not proposed as a sub-division but also states 
it has a value of $1,250.00 per acre; however, that land is an 
abundant mountain meadow. (Addendum iii, p. 2) 
2. Other Possible Uses of Land. There were no other 
uses for the land damaged (hill-side property) except for 
grazing, which was the use next highest to mountain lot 
development. (Addendum iii, p. 2) 
3. Value of the Land Before and After Thorsen 
Trenching. The value of the land for its suitability and 
availability for subdivision into lots and as raw land capable 
of conversion to that purpose was $1,250.00. Its value now is 
for grazing only and at a value of $50.00 per acre. But in 
1980 (apparently because of decreasing land values since 1980) 
the value of the raw land for grazing would have been $100.00 
per acre. (Addendum iii, p. 3) 
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THORSEN1S CONTENTIONS 
While admitting that both parties agreed the fair 
market value was $1,250.00 per acre [Brief Par. 5(f) p.9] still 
Thorsen ignores the uncontradicted evidence on record that the 
land, deprived of its potential value as a subdivision is 
$50.00 an acre now; $100.00 per acre immediately after the 
damage occurred. Thorsen seems to imply that the pre-damage 
values were also based upon agricultural use. This is wholly 
inconsistent with the facts. The remainder of the 94.47 acres, 
after severing the 50.9 acres in issue, is a lush meadow having 
capacity to support many cattle or livestock during the entire 
Summer. The subject land is dry ground covered with native 
trees. Thorsenfs own appraiser, at the time of trial, regarded 
the highest and best use value of the hillside property as 
subdivision development. At page 365 of the trial record Mr. 
Stott, testifying for Thorsen said: 
[P. 365]: I tried to find properties which were— 
could be used for development or were in the process of 
development, developed such as the subject property. (lines 
22-25) 
Q. — have you (as a result of the process) found an 
opinion or to the fair market value of the subject property? 
A. (p. 366) "*** $1,250.00 per acre ***" (lines 9, 
10) 
The Affidavit of Ken Esplin attached to Gooseberry's 
Motion to Assess Damages states that it is not now feasible to 
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develop a subdivision on the property (Addendum iii, p. 2). He 
states that the highest and best use for the property in 1980 
(or prior to the dredging committed by Mr, Thorsen) was as a 
"Subdivision or Mountain Lot Development" [Addendum iii, p. 2 
Par, 4(c)]. 
The Affidavit of the engineer D. Bruce Whited states 
that because of the excavation the property cannot be used for 
its previous highest and best use. On page 5 he states: "The 
present condition of your [the subject] property is not 
suitable for subdivision. The new ditch excavation, even after 
restoration, has made it virtually impossible to develop the 
subdivision at a profit". (Whited Affidavit, Addendum ii, p.5) 
Thorsen's only position is that the respective 
parties' appraisers agreed that the pre-damage value of the 
land in question was based upon its use for agricultural 
purposes. Nothing in the record supports this and in fact the 
record is unambiguous that the $1,250.00 per acre was, as 
stated in the Colorado case, Department of Highways vs. Schulhoff, supra, 
based upon this particular tract of land's suitability and 
availability for subdivision into lots and that it is valuable 
for that purpose. [$1,250.00 an acre for side-hill grazing 
would be an unheard of exaggeration of value.] 
We have attached as Addendum i a reduced copy of the 
trial court's Exhibit 1 which displays the entire 94.47 acres 
owned by Gooseberry. From this addendum it is apparent that 
the whole of the original Gooseberry purchase is composed of 
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two contrasting qualities of land having entirely different 
characteristics: The west portion is an abundant meadow; the 
east (damaged) portion is an uncultivable side-hill forested 
with pine and juniper. It is this east portion which was 
proposed for development and which now has no value for 
development and limited value even as grazing. (Addendum iii, 
p. 2) The appraisers in the original trial valued the meadow 
(the "remainder" and not subject to this litigation) for its 
obviously useful meadow grass production. The damaged land 
(Brief at p. 6) is the hill-side; without value except for 
sparse grazing and according to both Gooseberry affidavits now 
not suitable for development. The uncontradicted affidavits of 
Whited and Esplin say that after and because of the Thorsen 
trenching the 50.9 acre remainder is not suitable for 
development and its value for grazing on the 1980 market was 
$100.00 per acre. 
The "diminution of value" rule on a before-and-after 
calculation is $1,250.00 before, $100.00 after, yielding net 
damage of $1,150.00 per acre for 50.9 acres, or $58,535.00 
total diminution in value. The trial court reduced this to 
$38,785.00 in its calculation of the amount of land affected 
presumably on its inference that perhaps one or more 
individually-located houses could be built upon remote corners 
of the damaged 50.9 acres. (See Addendum i) It would have 
been speculative what one or possibly a few more building 
tracts would have been worth. However, this does not affect 
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the uncontradicted proof that the before and after difference 
in value of the 50.9 acres was $1,150.00 per acre. 
As noted above, the affidavits were served with the 
Motion to Reassess Damages and as the best effort to 
accommodate the Supreme Court's formula and method(s) under 
which damages should have been fixed in the first instance. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Uncontradicted affidavits under Rule 43(b), 
U.R.C.P. unequivocally fix the damages. 
2. Rule 43(b) is to be treated much like Rule 56, 
U.R.C.P. particularly subsection (e) of Rule 56 which requires 
a defense, if available; otherwise movant's affidavits are 
dispositive of the facts. 
3. The trial court appropriately used a formula for 
determining before and after values. 
4. Rule 43(b), U.R.C.P. parallels the old Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e). [The Utah Rules have been 
modified to convert prior Rule 43(e) now to become Rule 43(b).] 
Two Federal cases conclude that Rule 43 is to be considered in 
cases, not necessarily involving Summary Judgment, in the same 
manner as Rule 56(e) is applied where Summary Judgment im 
asked. Roucher vs. Traders & General Insurance Company, 235 F.2d 423; 
Board of Public Instruction vs. Meredith, et al., 119 F.2d 712. 
In Roucher it is implied that Rule 43 is the "parent11 
Rule (to affidavit-proof in Summary Judgments) providing for 
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admissibility of evidence by affidavits made reflecting 
personal knowledge. 
In Board of Public Instruction vs. Meredith, 119 F.2d 712, the 
Fifth Federal Circuit holds that in contested cases affidavits 
are sufficient to prove material facts when they conform with a 
rule such as Rule 43 and Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
The Affidavit of Mr. Esplin states that the next 
highest and best use below being developed as a subdivision or 
as mountain lots is grazing. [Addendum iii, p. 3 Par. 4(e)] 
Its highest value at the highest and best use immediately 
beneath subdivision or mountain development is for grazing, 
worth $100.00 per acre. Esplin states that there is no 
intermediate use between mountain subdivision and grazing (Id. 
Par. 4(c)]. 
The Supreme Court has held that expert testimony for 
both sides fixed the value of the land at $1,250.00 per acre. 
(745 P. 2d at p. 1246) The value now is only $50.00 per acre; 
however, as we recognize that values must be fixed as of the 
date of inflicting the damage (which was 1980) the salvage 
value of the land (for grazing as expressed in the Esplin 
Affidavit) was, in 1980, $100.00 per acre. Deducting $100.00 
per acre from $1,250.00 leaves $1,150.00 per acre as damage. 
The Supreme Court recognized the trial court's finding that 
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Gooseberry contemplated subdividing 50.59 acres (745 P.2d at 
1245) which, when multiplied by $1,150.00 per acre, leaves the 
sum of $58,178.50. 
A condemnation case from the State of Washington 
(Lange, et aL vs. State of Washington, 547 P. 2d 282) is parallel in that 
Thorsenfs actions effectively condemn the most valuable 
incident of Gooseberry's property, i.e.: the right to develop 
it. In effect, Thorsen"s unlawful action had the 
uncontrovertible effect of condemning the Gooseberry land 
because what was left after Thorsen invaded it was a severance 
impossible to reassemble. In the Lange case the Court said: 
In this case, the effect of the 
condemnation activity was to chain 
appellant to his land in a falling real 
estate market. Once the State manifested 
its unequivocal intent to appropriate the 
Lange property, appellants were precluded 
from exercising their business judgment and 
selling the property before the market fell 
further. Moreover, appellants were 
precluded from taking any steps to 
counteract the market decline by making 
improvements on the land or otherwise 
changing its use. Thus, appellants were 
deprived of the most important incidents of 
ownership, the rights to use and alienate 
property. In addition, because the 
condemnation did in fact take place, 
appellants were prevented from holding 
their property, as other owners would be 
able to do, until economic conditions 
improved and market values rose again. 
The findings of the trial court are not "clearly 
erroneous", if erroneous at all, although we suggest that the 
trial court should have awarded a higher amount to Gooseberry. 
The evidence demonstrably supports the amount of damages 
16 
reassessed. This court will examine all of the record evidence 
giving great weight to the findings made and the inferences 
drawn by the trial judge and setting them aside only if they 
are clearly erroneous. State vs. Walker, 743 P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). 
In Goodsell vs. Department of Business Regulation, 523 P. 2d 1230 
(Utah 1974) this Court likewise held that under several 
theories presented to the trial court the Appellate Court will 
affirm any result which finds support in the record 
irrespective of the theory under which that ground or basis was 
argued (cited at 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error. §1464(1). 
Therefore, under any theory or method of calculating 
damages, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover at the least 
the amount fixed by the trial court, which was the most modest 
of all awards possible. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has affirmed (at pp. 1244 and 1245 of 745 
P. 2d) several determinations made by the District Court and 
pointed out rules to be followed in reassessing damages: 
(1) That the evidence "fully supports the findings 
of fact and conclusions that Thorsen exceeded and abused his 
right to enter upon Gooseberry's land to clean the ditch and 
that Thorsen is liable for damages". (Majority opinion for 
Justice Howe at p. 1244 of 745 P.2d). 
(2) The trenching included "a substantial widening 
17 
and deepening of the ditch whereby a large number of trees were 
uprooted and an excessive amount of earth and rocks were 
excavated" (Id, reciting holdings of lower Court). 
(3) The generally accepted measure of damage for 
injury to real property is the difference between the value of 
the property immediately before and immediately after the 
injury ("Diminution in Value" rule). 
(4) It is proper to inquire what the entire tract is 
worth, having in view the purpose for which it is best adapted, 
but it is the tract, and not the lots into which it might be 
divided, that is to be valued. 
(5) It is proper to show that a particular tract of 
land is suitable and available for subdivision into lots and is 
valuable for that purpose (although not proper to show the 
number and value of lots as separated parcels in an imaginary 
subdivision thereof). 
We respectfully submit that the uncontradicted 
evidence before the Court predicated upon this Court directive, 
is that Gooseberry was damaged by $38,750.00 as the calculated 
direct damage to Gooseberry's property. The Judgment of the 
trial court in reassessing damages should be summarily 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN, McIF$\ ^CHAMBERLAIN 
By. ~" " 
Ken Chambefelail 
Attorneys fbr Respondent 
Gooseberry Estates 
18 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondents were mailed to Fredrick A. 
Jackman of Jackman and Johnson, Attorneys for Appellant 
Thorsen, 1327 South 800 East, Suite 300, Orem, Utah (84058), by 
U.S. regular mail, postage prepaid, on thfs 28th day of March, 
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Proposed Plat of Johnson Property, 
Reduction of Exhibit No. 4-B 
Thorsen Excavation 
Upper Ditch (existing) 
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KEN CHAMBERLAIN [0608] 
OLSEN, MCIFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
76 SOUTH MAIN, P.O. BOX 100 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
TELEPHONE: 896-A461 
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HARRY THORSEN, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MARKAY JOHNSON, v\ ol , 
I-' ' .:»:. . 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATFC 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
HARRY ThGl-.SE:, ^r:c .-CNA..J 
GATES, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
D. BRUCE WHITED 
'."CH RESTORATION COST 
AND SUMMARY 
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u. BRUCE WHITED, being first duly sworn 
deposes and says: 
That he ii a duly ! 1 censed professional c-ngir.eer having 
practiced in ---•>..:..-- -.--..e ±266. n<r •• graduate 
engineer iron iht 1'nivcrsit.y :^. . ,:u • =ind a° a ci . .. engineer ., .i-
- 2 -
Is 
J -
w 2 o 
n ** 
!° ! 
* * 5 0
 i 5 
* i 3 
IL O 3 
IL O j| 
0 j * 
Z * x 
§ 2 
Z z « 
LU » 
t/) en 
J « 0 
President and Manager of Canyon Lands Engineering Corporation, a 
Richfield, Utah engineering firm; has been a civil engineer 
designing and supervising the construction of municipal water, 
sewer, street, highway, bridge and other infra-structural systems 
and has designed and supervised the construction of dams and 
airports; that he is familiar with rules, regulations, ordinances 
in general or special laws related to all types of subdivisions. 
During the last twenty years he has supervised the development of 
mountain subdivisions, among them the types of development 
included in the captioned litigation, and has comprehensive 
knowledge concerning the economics of such endeavors. 
D. Bruce Whited makes the following statement under 
oath concerning the Gooseberry Estate Subdivision: 
I have physically inspected and know the past and 
present condition of the proposed mountain subdivision 
hereinafter described; have investigated the cost of restoring 
the land to a condition comparable to its condition before any 
unauthorized excavation or trenching of a ditch thereupon was 
made in approximately 1980 and effect thereof and the condition 
of said land if attempts are made to restore it to its former 
condition. 
DITCH RESTORATION COST AND SUMMARY 
PROJECT LOCATION: 
Gooseberry Estates Subdivision, Sevier County, Utah 
- 3 -
INTRODUCTION: 
In order to determine the cost of this ditch 
restoration project, it is first necessary to identify the upper 
limits of the restoration process. The cost to totally restore 
the subject area to its original, undisturbed condition is not 
definable. There are some elements of the project which have 
been destroyed and can never be duplicated or replaced, 
SCOPE: For the purpose of the cost estimate, I have limited the 
scope of project to include the restoration of the area to near, 
original elevations and contour. The scope does not include any 
of the costs involved in establishing new, suitable tree growth, 
nor does it address any measures required to camouflage the scar 
allowing the restored area to blend into the adjacent areas. The 
scope does, however, include the cost to properly backfill 
and compact the excavation, preparation of the suitable seedbed, 
installation of erosion control structures and the follow-up 
maintenance that will be required. 
GENERAL INFORMATION: 
The on-site inspection of the area revealed the 
following items of concern: 
1. The work area is confined and will require considerable 
hand labor to restore it properly. 
2. Proper construction methods and equipment selection by 
the contractor will be required in order to minimize 
additional damages to the area. 
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There are numerous large rocks and tree debris that 
cannot be incorporated in the backfill. This material 
will have to be removed from the site and properly 
disposed of. 
The soil conditions vary along the length of the 
excavation. In those areas where bedrock and heavy 
clays were encountered additional fill material will be 
required to provide a proper seedbed. 
The newly excavated ditch has created a drainage 
barrier along the entire length of the subdivision. 
Special preventive measures must be incorporated into 
the restoration process to prevent storm water from 
destroying the completed work. Loosely compacted soil 
in a confined excavation of this type is easily eroded 
if the ditch is not properly compacted. If erosion 
control structures are not installed, it is likely that 
a storm of moderate intensity would cause considerable 
damage to both the restored area as well as the lower 
adjacent property. 
COST ESTIMATE 
The cost to restore the excavation to its original 
elevation and contour are; 
- 5 -
No. Item Cost 
1. Backfill and compacting $15,000 
2. Rock Removal and clean-up 4,000 
3. Seedbed preparation 3,500 
4. Seeding 1,500 
5. Erosion control structure 2,500 
6. Supervision and maintenance 5,000 
7. Contingencies at 10% 3,200 
Total Cost $34,700 
ECONOMICS OF CONTINUING THE PROJECT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS 
The present condition of your property is not suitable 
for subdividing. The new ditch excavation, even after 
restoration, has made it virtually impossible to develop the 
subdivision at a profit. 
The original development cost for the 33 lots is 
unchanged at $5,200 per lot. In order to cover development 
costs, land costs, cost of money, sales commissions and realize a 
profit of at least $2,000 per lot, the average sales price needs 
to be $12,000 per lot. 
It is my opinion that before the ditch excavation, the 
majority of the lots would bring a minimum of $12,000. I would 
also expect the undisturbed lots adjacent to the Meadow to sell 
for slightly higher amounts as they were the most desirable. 
- 6 -
It is my opinion that because of the extensive 
excavation on the 11 previously undisturbed lots, 9 of which 
border the Meadow, lot sales will not average $12,000, There are 
now 18 lots out of 33 lots which will have major, highly visible 
swaths cut through the center, or near center. The prime lots 
are no longer prime. In addition, even the undisturbed lots have 
been decreased in value because the general conditions and 
overall aesthetics of the project have been adversely effected. 
In summary, the development costs (all fixed costs) 
have remained the same but the ability to make a profit from 
subdividing the property no longer exists. The overall value of 
the project has been decreased by an amount equal to the 
projected minimum of profit. 
^/0^<^^^^^^ 
D. Bruce Whited, P.E. 
License No. ^,T3<^>/^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public, 
.£/ 
t h i s
 >0?f day of February , 1988. 
Residing At: <^ 0 
My Commission Expires 
•/£jMi{^ - ^ 
fjf/?f°/02!& 
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KEN CHAMBERLAIN [0608] 
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
76 SOUTH MAIN, P.O. BOX 100 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
TELEPHONE: 896-4461 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
* * * * * * * * * 
HARRY THORSEN, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
MARKAY JOHNSON, et al., ) AFFIDAVIT OF KEN ESPLIN 
: CONCERNING DAMAGES 
Defendants. ) 
GOOSEBERRY ESTATES, et al., : Civil No. 8461 
Plaintiffs, : 
) 
vs. : 
HARRY THORSEN and DONALD : 
GATES, ) 
Defendants. ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
KEN ESPLIN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. That he is the witness, Ken Esplin, who testified 
as an expert in the captioned case which was tried on the 26th 
and 27th days of August, 1982 in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court in and for Sevier County. 
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2. That he repeats the same background experience, 
credentials and foundational statements he made as a basis for 
and authorizing his expressing or testifying as to an opinion 
concerning value of land. 
3. That as he testified in the captioned case at the 
time to trial he has inspected the real property known as the 
proposed Gooseberry Estates Subdivision. 
4. Using the same background, credentials and 
experience to which he testified in the captioned case and 
incorporating all the same by reference in this Affidavit he 
expresses the following opinions: 
(a) He reiterates the testimony that the real property 
subject of litigation consisting of approximately 50.9 acres was 
worth, without any improvements in the year 1980 the sum of 
$1250.00 per acre. 
(b) That it is not economically feasible to develop 
the land as a subdivision or for any other purposes without a 
complete restoration of the soil, the surface, the vegetation (or 
at least a substantial degree of vegetation including trees) as 
would be required in order to develop the land for any purpose. 
(c) He is of the opinion that the highest and best use 
of the property in 1980 prior to the excavation made thereon by 
the defendant Harry Thorsen was as a subdivision or a mountain 
lot development. That was the highest and best use then and 
there were no other uses available for the land then except for 
grazing. 
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(d) He has now reviewed evidence of D. Bruce Whited, 
made under oath, of the cost of restoring and the obstacles to a 
complete restoration of the subject property and is of the 
opinion that the development thereof as a subdivision is not 
feasible, either physically or economically, 
(e) He is of the opinion that the property's next and 
highest best use after development as a subdivision or a mountain 
development was, in the year 1980 and immediately prior to the 
damage done to it by the defendant Harry Thorsen, $100.00 per 
acre. He is of the opinion that the value of the land as of 
February 20th, 1988 is the sum of $50.00 per acre and that is and 
was the value of said land at its highest and best use to which 
it could be devoted now or could have been devoted at any time 
after the excavation made by Harj^ y-JThovsen. 
this 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public, 
day of February, 1988. 
Notary Public 
Residing At: Cedar City, Utah 
.on Expires: 
AT so, in naking a comparison apnroach through 
market value, if it's possible, to do a market grid, which 
I tried to do and through some interpretation of that, 
I placed the dollar figures on the comparable sales. 
0 Anything else involved in your process? 
A In looking at the overall property and the 
approach to take, I did look at whether to take the 
apnroach as to a corroleted subdivision and I did not 
take this apnroach for a counle of reasons: 
First o^ all, there are a number of pro-
perties that are in about the sane stage in the county as 
the subject property, waiting to get approval for water 
and that being the nalor hold up on those properties. 
Also, in the Accord Lakes Area, I did not use 
anv conparabl^s thore. There hive been sales there-
The reason being is that that is an approved subdivision, 
a drv subdivision, there are existing cabins there and 
a great deal of nonev and time has been spent in adver-
tising and give away programs, "If you come up, we'll give 
you a gift just for looking at the property," and I didn't 
feel like that would be a good conparable so I tried to 
find properties which were — could be used for develop-
ment or were in the nrooe?^ of being developed, developed 
such as the subject nroperty. 
O 'low, as a result of that process then, have 
10 
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1
 you f o m e d an oninion as to the fair market value of the 
2 subject property? 
3
 A Yes, as contained in the appraisal, I have 
4
 | indicated that the irrigations do affect the market value 
5
 of property; however, to clean such ditches has no 
6 measurable value or effect on the market value. Each 
7 sale is considered as to time, location, physical character 
8 istics, and condition of sale ^ased on the market condi-
9
 tions. It is rv/ opinion that the market value of the 
subject property is £1,250.00 per acre. 
11 0 And you reduced your appraisal work to a 
12 report? 
13 I A Yes. 
14
 0 H"ve you reduced your appraisal into a writ-
15 ten report? 
'6 A Yes, I have. 
17 0 And --
18 I TirS COTRT: Let ne just ask a question 
so I can understand your last answer. Are you saying 
20 II that, in your opinion, this ditch doesn't make any dif-
21 A ference one way or another? 
22 A Well, I did not appraise it as a subdivision. 
23 I appraised it as 50.5° acros in an as-is condition and 
24 || through the inspection that T r^ade of the property, it 
was tny opinion that it did, that a ditch iid exist there, 25 
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<JifT>rrnl pu rdhaaer*, and not hy conjec-
tural accounting estimated alone, Auto-
roatir C-anteen Co. v. K. T. C„ 1963, 346 
U i x 61, 6K, 73 S.Ot. 1017. 97 I,.Ed. #454. 
i t *»flji not. errnr to allow the Jury to ron-
Mider Una evidence. The trial imir l 
fkomteif oat the failure of defendant to 
introduce prpciac data. And properly d i s -
counted th<>. weight of this evidence b y 
adverting to "throe intangible clerocnto" 
an !**ing the proper subjects of revolt d-
oration oiify "for what they are worth.* 
[2j Sr.ttsrul, plaintiff also aJJcgcs er -
r o r in that part of the charge concert* 
injr the validity of the accounting pro-
cedure embodied in defendants coat 
**twdy. 8irjce Harper had no rcfevartt 
cewt records for the period of I1M1 t o 
1?>60, t/i<* ;*ccounta0t hired to prepare the 
ntudy u««Mi figures for 2961, adjusted 
backward* on the basis of general salary 
r- i tes puhNshcd by the Commerce and 
i n d u s t r y Association of New York. Al -
Oiongb such an accounting nv-thud ob-
v i o u s l y lack* the fuAJ mcaaure of <fe*ired 
prec is ion, i(. apjpcars to have been under-
t a k e n in gaod faith and to accord! with 
Ube minimal requirements of soond ac -
co i inHng principles. Indeed, under Ui« 
criricamstaiic<«, it appears to have been 
t h e be*t available procedure. Both the 
c o u r t * and the Federal Trade Cnmmia-
Hion have retmKniiced the dilemma con-
f r o n t i n g defendants in suit* such an 
t h o s e , And have liberally accepted data 
Herived from Ijt*^ntion-inspired /iccoont-
ir iK methods. S*c e. jr., American Can 
<^o. v. Ruiwu'ftvilJc Canning Co., H Cir.. 
J D S I , I9f F 2 d rtHt 59, and In re Minne-
« p n l i s Honeywell Regulator Co., 194S, 44 
F . T . C . 361, VM. Moreover, the trial 
csotirt correctly charged the jury that i t 
w \ n s "up to you as fx> whether yon wish 
t o accept or reject the assumptions made 
toy Gayfe (defendant's accountant] and 
t h e conclusions which he drew from 
them." 
.A further contention of plaintiff is 
t t i a t the court erred in refusing to 
c K a r g c tJhat defendant's cost sfndy im-
p r o p e r l y calculated comparative coef* 
f o r plaintiff and defendant's three larg-
e s t jobber*, by averaging total ship-
menta on a cumulative hem in for an en-
tire year. The complaint is that this 
approach uses saving?! rralint*? on large 
transactions with the favored customers 
to justify discrtmination in their favor 
on transactions invoiv**? mnaJJer quan-
tities, equivalent to plaintiff's purchas-
es. To require a seller in these circum-
stance* to jfJHtify thu co.*t differential in 
each and every tranniiction with hi» 
buyers, rather than on the aggregate 
baais of their dcaliiM/a, would prove un-
duly onerous. The impact of such a re-
quirement might he to discourage mil 
price differential*, even thoae actually 
justified by cost distinctions. Absent a 
showing that tac lark of uniformity in 
the price spread had any competitive 
significance, the FTC has permitted the 
use of aggregate coat dilferciKjea to jus-
tify price differentials. See, e, g.. In re 
£iytvar>ia Klectric Prodncta, Inc^ 1954, 
^ ' C Docket No. 5728, :i VAVtl Trade Reg. 
Rep. | 2&.J81. cSuch u method wsu* per-
raissibJe in this r*&e. Furfiicrmore, the 
trial court left the uTUmatje vaiidity of 
this computation to the determination of 
the jnry-
Tkird, plaintiff aMr«resi that the court 
erred in charging the jifry that it could 
deduct pro Umltt frt*n the amount of 
dAromxcH, if any. the extent of saving 
retailing from the transactions with the 
faivored costamer*. Although one court 
haa approved tfcis partud justifitratioii 
approach, see American *lan f>3. v. Jtns-
aellville Csnning Co.. 8 f.ir.. 15)51, 191 
YJ2d .V!, 6<»T it ia not r>eocv*aary for as to 
consider its validity sini-p the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of defendant 
and therefore never rearhrtd the question 
of the measure of damage*. 
[3 ] With respect to the aUeged prej-
udicial comment, fhc pEatntiif clairaa that 
the trial court in his charge to the jury 
tindnly emphasized a fetter wrftten by 
piaintiff to his creditors ah<irtry after 
a fire had destroyed his office building. 
The fetter indicated that pb in tiff was 
unable to pay hi* debts at ttiat time be-
cause all available ra*b, including i»-
auranee proc^eda, was being used to 
convert the building into un apart meat 
moxsemm t. njuaua * araraLix mmnukxm oour Ainr 
atmmm 2Sft W.M 411 
loose The trial judge afludod so this 
letter in res|kect to its bearing sw the 
puuntiffa credibility as a witness, siace 
i t contradicted his oral testimony, 
plaintiff's testimony waa an essentia) 
j„gredient of his case, as evidenced by 
hi«, appearance on the witness staoo) on 
Ave Hoeresaive days, and it waa not er~ 
r^ r for <-he court to advert to that evi-
dence, threat discretion ia accorded fed-
eral judges in commenting out portions 
of the evidence, aod even in expressing 
opinions with regard thereto, provided 
it is stated that the jury is the exclusive 
judge of the facts and need not adopt 
any opinion eipressed. Querela v. Unit-
ed Stale*f 1*33. 289 U.S. 486, 46^-470, 
S3 SCt. W8, 77 L.Kd. 1821; Pager *. 
Pennsylvania Rail Co.. 2 Cir., 1S47, 166 
F.Sd tt, &o; Flint v. Youngs town Sheet 
A Tnbe C^., 2 Cir., 1944, 143 FJKd 923, 
92/». These precautiona were observed 
by the court. Furthermore, the trial 
judge properly informed the jury that 
the plaintiff's motive for bringing the 
actioa had absolutely no bearing on his 
rights under the ftohinaon-Paiman Act, 
but waa relevant only to the extent that 
it bore on his credibility aa a witneaa. 
Since the trial court did not err in Its 
instructions to the j«ry, but rather left 
to it the determination of all issues of 
fart after proper inntructions on the law, 
the judgment below muat be affirmed. 
Affirmed-
vTOHam KJwartf BOUCHER 
r. 
TRAJ>K1W 4k CdKIVKRAX HiSURANCB 
CXIMPANT, 
NOL I 
United States Court of AppeaJa 
Fifth Circuit. 
July 20, 19S6. 
Antomohile negligence action. The 
United States District Court for the 
Eastern District m€ Ixaiisiana, Herb* 
W. Ca^natenberry, Chief Judge, graat 
summary tmr the defendant inasjrna 
coaapaay and an aanaeai waa Ufccn. Tl 
Csairt af Appeals, Kxvr^ Circuit Jndg 
held thai teatiaaany aa given s a s I n 
af a previous case, as related as an a4 
davit of counsel, waa not adsntassb 
where neither the present ptaisitaff m* 
anyone renreaenting him ee in nervti 
with him waa a pnrty to the previea 
action. 
Reversed and 
trial oa the raerita. 
cause reaaanrlad fc 
K3JT2> 
Where plaiHUff to antaanahile neg 
ligence action in federal court had ac 
been party to prior action in state ca*r< 
judgment §i stale court wee net re 
judicata in the action in federal eanrri 
2. ffegnfranoa «=»lMta, 91 
As general rule, iaauea of negligtng 
are not to be determined •usamsrity, am 
qoeation of a defendant's liability caa 
not be determined by court aa saaltsr o 
law nnlesn facts are andisnnttat said an 
auch that all reaaaaable snem, ha exer 
ctae af fair and impartial Jndgaitnf 
muat infer and conclude thenfrasa ULS 
defendant waa not negligent. 
S. Veducal Oval rVwcednre «^snsa1 
Amdavita are not adamiaaaase on sso 
tioa far summary jodgmest ualasn thei 
are mads on personal knowledge. Fed 
Rule* Ctv.frac. rule 56<e)# 28 UJSC.A 
4. rederniavtt i 
Generally, adnsiasi bib ty of evidence 
on motion for aumraary judgsaend hi i 
ject to rale relating to form and i 
biltty of evUUmat generally. Fsatstsuea 
Civ.Pruc. roles 43(a) . 66(e ) , 21 U A C A 
I t h r l rYoetdure -
Generally, evidence 
hearing mi a oaae would be ioadssaVssablc 
on motion for ssMnasary /aJgsaanm, eaaept 
that court may hear matter an nlldsrvita. 
Fed.»ukn Civ Proc rules 42 (e ) , 66(e>, 
28 U.S.(1A. 
Mm 
SSiSi 
